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THE NEBRASKA CAPITAL CONTROVERSY, 
1854-59 
JAMES B. POTTS 
Early in 1857 Mark W. Izard, in a letter to 
Senator Stephen A. Douglas, summed up the 
frustrations that marked his tenure as gover-
nor of Nebraska Territory. "If there is any-
thing on earth I desire more than all others," 
he told the Illinois senator, "it is to make this 
the model territory, and my faith is that if 
Congress will extend her a moderate share of 
liberality, the sacred doctrine of popular rights 
will fully be vindicated in her example." "But," 
he continued, "the path of your humble 
servant is extremely narrow and thickly set 
with snares on every side."l Chief among the 
"snares" that Izard spoke of was a bitter 
controversy over location of the capital, an 
issue that disrupted territorial politics and was 
much prolonged by personal disputes, townsite 
rivalries, and sectional divisions within the 
territory. 
Although strongly influenced by Demo-
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cratic administrations in Washington, political 
life in Nebraska between 1854 and 1859 
centered around issues of economic devel-
opment, including struggles over the promo-
tion of towns and the selection of railroad 
routes. From the first, problems common to 
the settlement of an underdeveloped frontier 
forced town promoters into politics. In-
adequate transportation, in particular, imped-
ed farm expansion and threatened to retard 
the growth of towns. Since the future devel-
opment of Nebraska's towns and thus of the 
territory itself hinged on railroad connections, 
the location of rail lines was destined to 
become a major political concern. But many 
Nebraska towns were speculations, pure and 
simple; their survival depended on their ability 
to attract a railroad, the capital, or some other 
institutional guarantee of urban success. Poli-
tics invariably became the means for town 
builders to influence the awarding of these 
valuable prizes. Because the Platte River natu-
rally split the territory into two sections, 
townsite competition was distinctly geograph-
ic: North and South Platte boosters regularly 
contended over the location of institutional 
and transportation facilities that could alter 
their section's prospects. One pioneer law-
maker noted that there were two Nebraska 
parties-North and South Platte-in that early 
period.: 
Sectional strife assumed its most dramatic 
form in a bitter struggle over the location of 
the territorial capital, which carried federal 
prestige, payroll, and patronage opportunity. 
Selection as the capital would all but guarantee 
one location's success as a governmental and 
commercial center. Capital city designation 
would assure the lucky town of population 
growth and a rise in the value of town lots and 
result in "the expenditure of thousands of 
dollars, a horde of [government] officials, [and] 
the busy hum of business activity." Such status 
would also ensure the arrival of the Pacific 
railroad, which most town boosters expected 
would pass through the territorial capital. 
Given the size of the stakes involved, the site 
of government was a matter of supreme 
importance to local boosters.; 
THE FIRST TERRITORIAL ASSEMBLY 
The Nebraska Act of 1854 specified that 
the territorial governor would select the meet-
ing site for the first assembly and stipulated 
that thereafter the legislature would determine 
the permanent seat of government. Governor 
Francis Burt, however, died shortly after his 
arrival in the territory and the task of putting 
the government into operation fell to the 
territorial secretary, Thomas B. Cuming, who 
became acting governor. Just five days after 
Burt's death, Cuming ordered the taking of a 
territorial census. The dispatch with which he 
moved demonstrated his impatience to orga-
nize territorial affairs to his own advantage 
before the appointment of a new governor. 
Unlike Burt, who seemingly had no fixed 
notion regarding the permanent location of 
the capital, Cuming was committed to the 
wishes of the Council Bluffs and Nebraska 
Ferry Company, the principal proprietor of 
Omaha City.4 
Once clothed with executive authority, 
Cuming moved quickly to organize civil gov-
ernment and to ensure the election of a 
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legislature that would permanently fix the 
capital at Omaha. He divided the territory 
into eight counties, four north and four south 
of the Platte River. And though the census 
showed nearly twice as many inhabitants 
south of the river, Cuming assigned the 
majority of the assembly seats to Omaha and 
the northern counties. He gerrymandered 
Bellevue, assigning that community to an 
election district dominated by Omaha voters. 
Then on 20 December 1854, after an election 
called posthaste, the acting governor an-
nounced that the first legislative session would 
be held at Omaha.' 
The first assembly was, as J. Sterling 
Morton later recalled, "a game to scramble 
with 'the devil take the hind-most' for its 
guiding rule." The primary object of conten-
tion was the capital. The South Platte dele-
gation was still formidable despite the 
unfavorable apportionment and came to Oma-
ha determined to strip the city of its prize. 
Bellevue, Florence, and other towns north of 
the Platte also envisioned their possible selec-
tion as the site of government. Knowing that 
the legislature could reverse the executive's 
decision, all "realized the importance of the 
session upon our own personal interests," 
noted one Omaha supporter. 6 
During the legislative debates on the capi-
tal question, "dear bought popular sovereignty 
seemed for a time below par," according to one 
observer. "It was a bloodless war of words 
between North and South of the Platte, with a 
slight display of inclination to carry it at the 
risk of burning powder. ,,; After weeks of bitter 
debate, threats of physical violence, and much 
private manipulation, five legislators (four 
members of the house and one councilman) 
deserted the "removalists" and voted for 
Omaha. On 22 February 1855 the assembly 
officially placed the capital at Omaha.s Oma-
ha's status as capital was never secure, howev-
er. Representatives of Bellevue and the South 
Platte towns generally refused to let the issue 
die, and the question of whether the govern-
ment should remain in Omaha dominated 
legislative sessions for the next several years. 
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A NEW GOVERi'.'OR ARRIVES 
Governor Mark Izard arrived in Omaha on 
20 February 1855, at the close of the first 
legislative session. Despite scattered local crit-
icism, the new executive was generally well 
received throughout the territory. For a time it 
appeared he might even bring stability to 
Nebraska politics. In his first formal address to 
the assembly, Izard carefully avoided divisive 
local issues and called the legislature's atten-
tion to more urgent needs of the territory. He 
urged the immediate passage of general elec-
tion and tax laws and, as a temporary expe-
dient, suggested the adoption in toto of the 
civil and criminal law codes of Iowa. And to 
the astonishment of the legislators, he offered 
to surrender his powers of appointment to the 
voters "in conformity with the principles of 
popular rights." Finally, noting that the noble 
experiment of popular sovereignty \vas on trial 
in Nebraska, he cautioned the lawmakers and 
the people "to rise above local jealousies and 
personal animosities, and adhere to the great 
principles of concession and conciliation."" 
Governor Izard's political life in Nebraska 
was nevertheless short and unhappy. Like 
most federal officials sent to the territory, he 
viewed his appointment as a means to personal 
financial gain. In partnership with his son 
James, who conducted a banking and real 
estate business in Omaha, he engaged in 
numerous land and business speculations. 
Izard obtained one-twentieth part ownership 
of the capital city and acquired interests in 
other important county sites north of the 
Platte. He eventually identified his interests 
with those of Enos Lowe, Jesse Williams, and 
other members of the Omaha and Council 
Bluffs business community. lc' Once his pro-
Omaha sympathies became apparent, the 
removalists began to oppose his administration 
and to work for his dismissal, denouncing him 
as "the mere agent or tool" of Iowa specu-
lators-"the Governor of Council Bluffs and 
Omaha City Ferry Company."" 
Factionalism continued to plague Nebraska 
politics despite Izard's plea for "concessions 
and conciliation." Indeed, the settlement of 
the capital question in favor of Omaha by the 
first legislature intensified sectional hostilities. 
No sooner had the new executive arrived and 
the assembly adjourned than the territorial 
residents began to direct their attention to the 
election of the second assembly and a new 
delegate to Congress. 
A DELEGATE TO CONGRESS 
The two principal contenders for the 
delegate post were Hiram P. Bennett, a youth-
ful Nebraska City lawyer, and Bird B. Chap-
man, a political adventurer who tied his 
ambitions to Omaha. Chapman, a classic 
example of the pre-Civil War carpetbagger, 
quit a minor Washington clerkship in 1854 
and went to Nebraska to run for Congress. He 
failed to secure election, and having taken the 
precaution of establishing his own news organ, 
the Omaha Nebraskian, he went back East to 
await the next canvass. Returning to the 
territory in 1855, some weeks before the 
election, he organized the Omaha townsite 
promoters and most of the federal officials, 
including Izard and Cuming, into a temporary 
alliance to back his candidacy for the delegate 
seatY 
Hiram Bennett was the hand-picked candi-
date of the Nebraska City Town Site Compa-
ny. A native of Maine, Bennett had come west 
by way of Ohio, Missouri, and Iowa. In 1854 
he migrated to Nebraska City from Sidney, 
Iowa, at the urging of his friend and subse-
quent business partner, Stephen F. Nuckolls. 
A South Platte townsite booster and an ardent 
removalist, Bennett had the general support of 
the southern counties and of anti-Omaha 
elements around Bellevue and Florence. A 
third candidate, John Thayer, a New En-
glander who had migrated to Omaha from 
Massachusetts in 1854, ran on an independent 
platform and eschewed sectionalism as detri-
mental to the development of the territory. Il 
The campaign revolved around local eco-
nomic and personality issues. Party lines were 
nonexistent, though labels like "Border 
Roughian" and "Know Nothing" were occa-
sionally attached to Thayer and Bennett by 
the Chapman press. Mostly it was a North 
Platte versus South Platte affair-those advo-
cating capital relocation and reapportionment 
versus those supporting the status quo. Thus, 
Chapman's supporters ignored Thayer and 
concentrated their attacks on Bennett and the 
Nuckolls-Nebraska City gang while the latter 
denounced Chapman and his federal allies as 
nonresident speculators. Both sides were liber-
al in promises of reward, holding out land 
offices and other federal favors to "every one-
horse town in the territory. "I' 
Plural voting, vote buying, ballot box 
stuffing, and other irregularities were common 
in the election of 1855. In November, Nebras-
ka voters-and some voters from Iowa and 
Missouri-went to the polls. The territorial 
board of canvassers found considerable evi-
dence of fraud on both sides. Had all the votes 
been accepted as valid, Bennett would have 
received a majority of thirteen. But the advan-
tage rested with Chapman, who commanded 
the support of the federal officials. The pro-
Chapman canvassers rejected the votes of four 
counties, three of which recorded Bennett 
majorities. By the final count, Chapman was 
awarded a majority of 113 and certified the 
winner. I; 
Bitter charges of fraud and bribery flew 
between the two candidates when the results 
were posted. Bennett immediately announced 
his intention of contesting Chapman's seat 
and proceeded to gather evidence of fraud and 
illegal voting while Chapman did the same. 
The dispute, ultimately settled in favor of 
Chapman, was the first of a series of contested 
elections that lasted until 1862. During much 
of the period between 1855 and 1862, Nebras-
ka was denied effective representation in 
Congress. Candidates openly announced their 
intent to contest results-should they lose-
before votes were even cast. The situation led 
critics to suggest that candidates entered the 
delegate race to secure a paid trip to Washing-
ton. A local editor noted the unfortunate 
result of these contests on territorial patron-
age. "One great reason why so little has 
heretofore been secured for Nebraska," he 
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wrote, "is that she has never yet had a delegate 
so situated that he could work for the territo-
ry; he has always devoted the most of his time 
to watching and defending his seat."" 
REMOVIl"G THE CAPIT AL FRO~1 OMAHA 
The bitterness engendered by the delegate 
contest carried over into the assembly session 
of 1856, described by one observer as "one 
continued personal and local fight, a constant 
attempt at bargain, sale, and argument."l; The 
anti-Omaha forces returned to the assembly 
determined to undo the capital location of the 
previous session. But while the removalists 
comprised a slim majority and controlled the 
organization of the lower house, the adminis-
tration group was able to divide and conquer 
their factious opponents. Though unable to 
remove the capital, they did succeed in trim-
ming Omaha's representation in the assembly 
by placing Bellevue in a separate election 
district. They also passed a bill authorizing a 
new legislative apportionment, and in an 
action aimed at Chapman, enacted a one-year 
residency requirement for delegate candi-
dates. le 
By the end of 1855 it was obvious that 
Omaha would never permit an outright re-
moval bill to pass the assembly. The removal-
ists also realized that the capital aspirations of 
the larger Missouri River towns precluded 
relocation to an established point, and so the 
leaders determined to move the seat of govern-
ment to the interior. This plan won the 
general approval of those urban boosters, on 
both sides of the Platte, who sought to humble 
Omaha. It also converted residents of set-
tlements in central Nebraska and local specu-
lators to the support of capital removal. 
The removalists first attempted this ploy in 
January 1856, at the tag end of the second 
assembly session, with a bill locating the seat of 
government at Chester, a paper town "some-
where on Salt Creek." The plan almost 
succeeded, but at the last minute three South 
Platte members joined the Omaha forces to 
defeat the measure. I') 
176 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1988 
The removalist leaders then determined to 
move the seat of government to another 
interior location. Sometime during the sum-
mer of 1856 a group headed by Stephen F. 
Nuckolls and E. W. McComas, a Virginian 
interested in Nebraska lands, drafted a bill for 
the third legislature that would authorize the 
placement of the territorial capital at Douglas 
City-a site they controlled. Meanwhile, to 
smooth the way the Douglas promoters divid-
ed the townsite into shares which were subse-
quently distributed freely among the members 
of the assembly.20 
By the winter of 1856-57 the removalists' 
prospects seemed bright. Until then, most of 
the northern county representatives had been 
either residents of Omaha and Council Bluffs 
or friends and agents of Secretary Cuming. 
During the first session Omaha and its allies 
had controlled slightly more than half the 
seats in the assembly. But by the end of 1856 
the situation had radically changed. The 
addition of six new counties, the creation of an 
independent Bellevue district (with one coun-
cilman and four representatives), and the 
enactment of a new apportionment that 
increased legislative membership by thirteen 
had caused a marked reduction in Omaha's 
voting power. Moreover, lesser North Platte 
counties had grown more independent and 
had begun to challenge Omaha's control over 
territorial politics. 21 
By the third assembly in January 1857, the 
Omaha partisans had been reduced to a 
minority faction in the legislature, and the 
removalists appeared to have the upper hand. 
They controlled twenty-five out of thirty-five 
seats in the lower house and nine out of a 
possible thirteen in the council, along with the 
presiding officers of both houses. 22 Feeling that 
the moment of success was upon them, they 
set out to remove the seat of government from 
Omaha. The Omaha faction, led by the 
formidable Andrew Jackson Hanscom and 
backed by a friendly lobby, determined to 
retain the capital at all costs. 
When the legislators considered the reloca-
tion bill, excitement ran high and normal 
parliamentary procedure collapsed at times. 
On one occasion the speaker, Isaac Gibbs, 
ordered Hanscom arrested, whereupon 
Hanscom and his friends made things so warm 
for Gibbs "that he dared not occupy the 
chair." The anti-Omaha members requested 
the governor to station militiamen in the 
assembly to protect them from the "factious 
opposition of the minority and the riotous ... 
mob of persons thronging the lobby." Despite 
every effort to prevent passage, the removalists 
pushed through a motion creating a committee 
of three to consider relocating the capital. Two 
days later, the committee reported favorably 
and the lawmakers, "their pockets lined with 
scrip," voted to move the government to 
DouglasY 
OMAHA FIGHTS BACK 
While the removalist press joyfully boasted 
that "the ship sinketh," Omaha backers were 
not dismayed.24 As expected, Governor Izard 
vetoed the measure as a direct contradiction of 
the Organic Act. Congress, he insisted, had 
never intended removal once federal funds had 
been appropriated and expended for the 
construction of a capitol. Pointing to the 
central location of Omaha-"immediately op-
posite the great gateway into the territory"-he 
moreover challenged the necessity and motive 
for moving the capital to "a floating town, not 
only without a location, but without inhabit-
ants."25 
Meanwhile, the Omaha faction secured 
new allies in the assembly. Through the 
expenditure of $3000 and the promise of the 
territorial government printing contract, they 
won over two members who had previously 
voted for removal, Robert W. Furnas and 
Albert Finney. The desertion of Furnas in the 
council left the removalists without the two-
thirds vote necessary to override the gover-
nor's veto, and thus the bill was indefinitely 
postponed. "The treachery of Furnas . . . left 
us without a two-thirds vote and we could do 
nothing to get him back," lamented Gibbs. 
"He has grasped the entire interest of the 
territory and direct interests oi the South 
Platte in his avaricious hand and hauled us 
down."" 
Resentment against Governor Izard grew 
during the early months of 1857. Though the 
governor previously had attracted occasional 
criticism, Izard's pro-Omaha stance in the 
capital affair, coupled with his opposition to 
several banking measures approved by the 
assembly, unleashed a wave of local discontent 
that resulted in his dismissal. In January 1857 
the governor complained to Stephen Douglas 
that "a miserable batch of hungry office 
seekers ... have since the election come down 
upon us like an avalanche." "They are at this 
time straining every nerve to sow the seeds of 
discord among the people by taking advantage 
of the petty jealousies ... between the differ-
ent sections of the Territory, with a view to 
effect the [removal of] present Federal Offi-
cers."'; 
REMOVING THE GOVERNOR 
By 1857 the elimination of the Izard-Cum-
ing clique had become the primary aim of the 
anti-Omaha faction. Embittered by the gover-
nor's recent activities and encouraged by the 
inauguration of a new national administra-
tion, Izard's adversaries took the offensive with 
the close of the third legislative session. 
Immediately upon adjournment, a delegation 
of lawmakers hastened to Washington with a 
petition urging Izard's removal, signed by 
twenty-three of the thirty-five members of the 
assembly. Other protests forwarded to the 
State Department charged him with incompe-
tence, bribery, extortion, abuse of the veto 
power, and fraudulent expenditure of federal 
funds. Meanwhile, the anti-Izard press em-
barked upon its own local crusade against the 
governor. "We want a man who will be 
governor of the whole territory," exclaimed 
the Florence Courier, "not one like Mark W. 
Izard who will stick himself down in Omaha 
and confine himself to its limits ... idling 
away his time in the mere animal enjoyments 
of eating, drinking, and sleeping to the man-
ifest neglect of the interests of those over who 
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[sic] he has been sent to preside."" 
Isaac L. Gibbs, a member of the legislative 
delegation that had journeyed to Washington, 
informed the Secretary of Interior that Izard 
was "unfit to govern." He charged that the 
governor had held up the incorporation of six 
territorial banks, offering to approve them "if 
the legislature would endorse him and recom-
mend his retention in office." Opponents also 
charged that he had acted improperly in the 
awarding of contracts for the construction of 
the territorial capitol, even to the extent that 
he was, in fact, the principal contractor. N 
By the spring of 1857 the governor's 
situation had deteriorated markedly and his 
removal appeared certain. In March, Izard 
hastened to Washington to mend his political 
fences and, with some difficulty, managed to 
retain his office. Although Buchanan had 
appointed William Richardson in his stead, 
the latter declined the post and Izard was 
temporarily reinstated with the understanding 
that he would submit his resignation effective 
1 October 1857. 
In July, George L. Miller, a youthful 
Omaha politico, surveyed the political and 
economic condition of the territory. He la-
mented that "the signs of the times are 
ominous of coming storms," a forecast con-
firmed by subsequent events. Feuding kept the 
territory in a state of agitation throughout the 
summer and fall, a condition that coincided 
with the sudden decline of Nebraska's econ-
omy in September 1857.!l 
REPLACING THE 
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATE 
Five candidates announced for the dele-
gates hip in 1857. The forces opposing Omaha 
undertook to win territory-wide support for 
the replacement of Chapman as delegate. 
Under the guise of a "squatter convention," 
the anti-Omaha forces met at Bellevue in July 
and nominated Fenner Ferguson, chief justice 
of the territorial supreme court and a resident 
of Bellevue. Ferguson ran on a platform 
advocating equal rights for all portions of the 
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territory, liberal federal appropriations, and 
"the sovereign right of people to remove the 
capital. 'lie 
Meanwhile, the Izard-Omaha group had 
become disenchanted with Delegate Chap-
man, who had not only failed to tap the 
congressional pork barrel but had diverted the 
territorial patronage to nonresident friends 
and relatives. The administration supported 
instead the candidacy of Attorney General 
Experience Estabrook. Although identified 
with the capital city, Estabrook tried to 
broaden his appeal by supporting federal aid 
for the trans-Nebraska railroad, a bridge over 
the Platte, a north-south military road, and 
completion of the territorial capitol. ii 
Still another faction, backed by Robert W. 
Furnas and the Nebraska Advertiser, supported 
Benjamin P. Rankin, a banker-speculator and 
former territorial marshall. Although hailed 
by the Advertiser as "the best man for South 
Platte interests," Rankin ran on a platform 
aimed at reaching all portions of the popula-
tion." John Thayer of Omaha was a fourth 
contender. 
Delegate Chapman was not without power, 
even though the governor and the Omaha 
Ferry Company crowd had deserted him. He 
chafed under the "horrible" treatment he had 
received from Izard and his friends and was 
determined to "beat them all."'; Chapman 
aligned himself with Secretary Cuming and 
other disaffected territorial appointees. Mean-
while, he had been scheming to eliminate his 
opponents within the federal cadre and in 
particular to have Izard replaced by Chap-
man's friend and political ally, Augustus C. 
Hall. In the late summer he returned to the 
territory and announced his intention to run 
for re-election. Ever a gambler, he determined 
to force the capital city partisans to unite 
behind his candidacy or face defeat. This 
calculated "rule or ruin" strategy was only 
partially successful. Estabrook subsequentl'! 
withdrew from the race, but the bitterness 
engendered by Chapman's activities destroyed 
unity within the Omaha ranks. The Omaha 
Times continued its onslaughts on "Bought B. 
Chapman," while former Estabrook support-
ers scattered behind other contenders. i,' 
In an extremely close election Ferguson 
won with 1654 votes to Chapman's 1597. The 
two remaining candidates, Rankin and Thay-
er, polled 2594 ballots between them, includ-
ing 711 of Omaha's 1529 votes. The inclusion 
of Rankin and Thayer in the contest, com-
bined with Chapman's poor showing of 27 
percent in Omaha, were important factors in 
his defeat. More decisive, however, was the 
influence of Governor Izard and the territorial 
board of canvassers. Despite evidence of 
fraudulent voting and padded returns, the 
canvassers upheld the original vote. Izard 
assumed the novel position that the sole duty 
of the canvassers was to tally the votes and 
certify the winner. With all the votes counted 
as valid, Ferguson was declared the winner by 
a majority of fifty-seven. Chapman contested 
the results, but Congress eventually recognized 
Ferguson as the legally elected delegate. J; 
OMAHA IS OUTVOTED 
The anti-Omaha group not only secured 
the defeat of Chapman in 1857, but they also 
elected a majority of the members of the 
legislature. From the beginning of the session it 
was clear that a large number of the lawmakers 
were in favor of moving the government from 
Omaha. The capital city solons negotiated 
with various local representatives to leave the 
capital where it was, promising to support 
various local franchise bills in return. For a 
time their logrolling tactics were productive, 
but toward the end of the session an incident 
occurred that resulted in the eventual disrup-
tion of the assembly. Early in January the 
lawmakers discovered that Omaha had never 
officially relinquished title to "capital square" 
and had even pledged the capital buildings and 
grounds, along with other city properties, as 
surety on a local scrip issue. The excitement 
caused by these disclosures played into the 
hands of the removalists, who immediately 
introduced a new bill to relocate the seat of 
government. 
The Omahans intended to block removal 
and they were prepared to employ desperate 
means. According to the testimony of one 
South Platte member, Omaha partisans swore 
that "unless the [capital) bill be withdrawn, 
not another act of any kind would pass during 
the session." On 7 January, the day after the 
relocation measure was proposed, the capital 
city solons managed (by a bit of parliamentary 
legerdemain) to control the lower house and 
began to filibuster. A violent row ensued, 
during which an Omaha backer leaped from 
the gallery onto the assembly floor and 
grabbed the speaker "by the back of his neck 
and the seat of his trousers [and) laid him with 
great force under the speaker's table." Only 
with difficulty and "in the midst of uproar and 
confusion, the brandishing of dirks and threats 
of shooting" was adjournment effected. '9 
The following day, 8 January, the anti-
Omaha members left the capital and reas-
sembled at Florence. The seceders, who re-
tained a majority in both houses, then passed a 
measure creating a capital removal commission 
which was to select a site, to be called 
Neapolis, at a point fifty miles west of the 
Missouri and within six miles of either side of 
the Platte. They also set off Florence as a 
separate election district in Douglas County in 
an attempt further to reduce Omaha's legis-
lative strength. In the meantime the minority, 
backed by Acting Governor Cuming and 
controlling the official records, continued to 
hold sessions in Omaha.'" 
The new governor, William D. Richardson, 
reached Omaha on 10 January determined to 
curtail the endless factionalism which his 
predecessor had bequeathed him. He indicated 
his impartiality in the Florence affair by 
seeking the legal opinion of the territorial 
supreme court as to which legislature was 
competent to sit. After consulting with the 
justices he refused to acknowledge the Flor-
ence seceders, declaring that Omaha would 
continue as the seat of government until "some 
other place is fixed upon by the joint action of 
the Governor and the Legislative Assembly." 
He urged the rump members to return to the 
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capital, guaranteeing them ample military 
protection. The bolters, however, had "deter-
mined upon a different course" and conse-
quently refused." 
A TTEMPTINC; TO SPLIT THE STATE 
The fourth legislature accomplished little 
in the way of lawmaking, but it did awaken 
separatist interest in the South Platte region. 
Disillusioned by the course of political events, 
the editor of the Nebraska City News com-
mented on the Florence fiasco of 1857-58: "We 
see in it the cheering sign that Nebraska is to 
be politically dismembered; we see in it anoth-
er overwhelming argument ... in favor of the 
speedy, peaceful separation of South Platte, 
Nebraska from North Platte.': 
By mid-1858 a serious movement to attach 
the South Platte to Kansas was proceeding 
apace. Annexation occupied the public mind 
"almost to the exclusion of everything else."4l 
Spearheaded by Nebraska City, which sought 
the location of the Kansas capital "somewhere 
in that latitude," South Platte separatists 
designed a series of petitions, resolutions, and 
mass meetings that placed the South Platte on 
record as being united behind the annexation 
movement. At a convention called at Brown-
ville on 29 January 1858, a petition was passed 
urging that southern Nebraska "be embraced 
within the boundaries of the proposed State of 
Kansas," and a committee of three was ap-
pointed to present the annexationists' case 
before Congress. At a subsequent meeting at 
Nebraska City, separatist leaders invited the 
people of the region to select delegates to 
represent South Platte at the forthcoming 
Kansas Constitutional Convention at Wyan-
dotte." 
In Washington, the annexationists gained 
the support of Senator James Green, Represen-
tative James Craig of Missouri, and others 
"occupying prominent positions" who viewed 
annexation as "the means of settling the vexed 
Kansas question."" Kansas Democrats, who 
apparently believed that the addition of south-
ern Nebraska would ensure Democratic con-
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trol in Kansas, also backed the movement. At 
the request of Governor Samuel Medary, the 
Kansas legislatures of 1858 and 1859 enacted 
resolutions asking Congress to extend Kansas' 
northern boundary to the Platte River. The 
Kansas governor, meanwhile, was quietly 
urging the Nebraska separatists to elect dele-
gates to represent their cause at Wyandotte." 
While the annexationists enjoyed the sup-
port of many Kansas Democrats and South 
Platte residents, the separatist movement faced 
numerous obstacles. Factionalism within the 
old sectional coalition undermined the 
movement from the beginning. Several South 
Platte leaders, including J. Sterling Morton, 
deserted the separatists. Traditional allies to 
the north at Bellevue and Florence also 
opposed separation. Moreover, the introduc-
tion of party politics in the territory in 
1858-59, which resulted in the election of a 
South Platte delegate, weakened old sectional 
and factional alignments. The project also 
encountered strong opposition in Kansas from 
Republican leaders and from south Kansas 
townsite boomers who viewed the extension of 
the northern boundary as a threat to their 
own capital aspirations. Finally, the anti-ad-
ministration majority in Congress was general-
ly unsympathetic to the plan. Several 
annexation bills were introduced in Congress, 
but none passed either house. In July 1859 the 
final blow was delivered by the Kansas Consti-
tutional Convention at Wyandotte, which 
emphatically rejected the schemeY 
LINCOLN 
Ironically, sectional partisanship began to 
recede at the same time physical separation 
was being promoted as a solution. The issues 
continued to be familiar ones concerning 
material progress and development, but after 
"the Florence secession" the capital question 
ceased to dominate Nebraska politics. After 
1858, in fact, political competition was rechan-
neled along national party lines and was 
increasingly influenced by issues of national 
politics. Especially during the 1860s, Civil 
War-related issues, including a heated partisan 
debate over Nebraska statehood, predomi-
nated over more purely local concerns like 
capital relocation. The capital issue was, 
however, revived by statehood. In 1867 the 
first regular session of the state legislature 
authorized the creation of a new state capital, 
and in 1868 the permanent seat of govern-
ment-along with the state penitentiary and 
university-was established south of the Platte 
at the yet undeveloped city of Lincoln where it 
remains today. Even then the troublesome 
perennial question of where the capitol should 
be did not die: removalists made several 
attempts during the 1870s to move the govern-
ment again, and although they failed, the 
merits of capital relocation continued to be 
debated in Nebraska political circles into the 
twentieth century.48 
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